Introduction. There is an increasing demand for security mechanisms for mobile devices that will be able to control execution of different interacting applets in a concurrent environment. An analysis of the security requirements for the booming domain of mobile games [4] shows that to capture some of the requirements we need to introduce a notion of session. A session accumulates all events that occur in the application since we have started it and until it is terminated. Then we can aggregate the constraints into two large classes: constraints on the current session and constraints across multiple sessions of the application (or its interaction with other applications).
Introduction. There is an increasing demand for security mechanisms for mobile devices that will be able to control execution of different interacting applets in a concurrent environment. An analysis of the security requirements for the booming domain of mobile games [4] shows that to capture some of the requirements we need to introduce a notion of session. A session accumulates all events that occur in the application since we have started it and until it is terminated. Then we can aggregate the constraints into two large classes: constraints on the current session and constraints across multiple sessions of the application (or its interaction with other applications).
Bi-dimensional model of execution. To capture multiple sessions we propose a model of the system with two "time" dimensions (a bi-dimensional model). The horizontal time dimension determines the progressing of an application during a session. The vertical dimension represents all the sessions started by the system.
To describe the properties of the model we proposed a logical language 2D-LTL. It has temporal operators of two categories: local, which refer to the current session, and global, that link the sessions between each other. E.g. "previously local" operator refers to the previous state of the current session, while "previously global" gives us the current state of the previous session. By combining these operators one can express some interesting security policies that cannot be captured by other languages. In the technical report [2] we show how 2D-LTL policies can be monitored efficiently using recursive formula evaluation.
UML translation Temporal-logic formulae are inconvenient for humans, especially when they put restrictions on multiple interacting applications running in parallel. A graphical specification language, that represents interacting programs in an intuitively comprehensible visual form, can simplify the task of policy writing. UML interaction diagrams [3] give an example of such graphical language. * Partly supported by projects EU-IST-STREP-S3MS, FIRB-SECURITY.
However, the diagrams lack convenient formal semantics, and it hampers their use for automated verification.
So we propose to use 2D-LTL as formal semantics of UML interactions. In our research we rely on the existing trace semantics of interactions called STAIRS [1] . In this semantics every diagram is associated with sets of positive (definitely accepted) and negative (rejected) traces of execution. One can find for each diagram a pair of 2D-LTL formulae, one of which will be satisfied by all positive traces and the second -by all negative ones. Our translation captures such UML 2.0 operators as alt, seq, refuse.
Conclusion. The proposed combination of temporal logic language 2D-LTL with UML sequence diagrams allows security policies i) expressive enough to capture multiple sessions and interacting applications, ii) suitable for efficient monitoring, iii) convenient for a developer to specify them.
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